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ABSTRACT: The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of
interest in various research communities. Here I want to focus on their use in logic and
argumentation studies. I will approach these topics from the perspective of an informal logician who
finds himself struggling with some issues that surround the idea of and the deployment of the
concept of defeasibility. My intention is to make those struggles as clear as I can.
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Informal Logic Initiative

1. INTRODUCTION
The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of
interest in various research communities. Here I want to focus on their use in logic
and argumentation studies. I will approach these topics from the perspective of an
informal logician who finds himself struggling with some issues surrounding the
idea of, and the deployment of, the concept of defeasibility. My intention is to make
those struggles as clear as I can.
I begin with a very brief history of the notion of defeasibility. Then I consider
the expositions by Pollock in (2008) and, to a lesser degree (1995). Then I identify
what I take, from the perspective of Informal Logic, to be the some of the issues that
emerge from those considerations.
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “DEFEASIBILITY”
Let’s distinguish between the idea of defeasibility, which many trace back to
Aristotle, and the term itself. According to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, the
term was introduced to philosophers by H.L.A. Hart in a paper “The Ascription of
Rights and Responsibilities”1 where he makes the point that “legal concepts do not
describe actions but ascribe responsibility or liability, ascription defeasible in proof
of exceptions. Legal philosophers debate law’s defeasible (presumptive, prima facie)
moral obligatoriness” (p. 181). Two important features emerge here. First, that
“defeasibility” applies to claims that can be cancelled or nullified in face of proven
1

In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49 (1949), pp. 171-94.

Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-12.
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exceptions. Second, the association of “defeasible” with terms likes “presumptive”
and “prima facie.” To claim that P is defeasible (a la Hart) is to hold that there is a
presumption in favour of P, or that the basis for P is prima facie.
A second prominent setting is epistemology. Both Pollock and Chisholm use the
concept to discuss problems of perception.2 Pollock’s use of the term Cognitive
Carpentry (1995) and Defeasible Reasoning (2008) finds him engaged in an
epistemologico-philosophical project that has connections to and ramifications for
informal logic and argumentation studies.
A third setting in which the term appears is in Computer Studies’ approaches
to argumentation. History tells us that the term worked its way into the lexicon of
argumentation theorists in the 1980s when those involved in Computer Studies (an
offshoot of AI) began to take in hand the task of modelling common sense reasoning.
Here is how Prakken (1980) explained it in what has come to be known as the
Dagstuhl Manifesto:
Modeling commonsense reasoning in AI is a difficult task given that it almost always
occurs in the face of incomplete and potentially inconsistent information.
Argumentation formalisms are defeasible reasoning systems which work by
considering the reasons that lead to a given conclusion (or claim) through a piece of
reasoning (the supporting argument) and the potential challenges (or counterarguments) for accepting that conclusion. In this manner, the mechanisms proposed
model reasoning as a dialectical process, i.e., the exchange of arguments and counterarguments respectively advocating and challenging the claim of the initial argument.
This process offers a remarkable tolerance to the problems introduced by the
potential inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the knowledge source.

In explications of “defeasibility” in this setting, the distinction between monotonic
and nonmonotonic logic/reasoning is often mentioned. This distinction is not easily
explained. The term “monotonic” applies to a mathematical function that varies in
such a way that it either never decreases or never increases. “A logic is monotonic if
the conclusions that follow from a set of premises also follow from all Supersets of
Premises. This means that a derivable conclusion cannot become underivable as a
result of the addition of one or more premises” [Law and Defeasibility, Wikipedia,
Japp Huge, retrieved December 2012]. The insight that many arrived at was that
monotonic systems of logic could not be applicable to a great many real world
situations; so began the interest in what are called nonmonotonic logics. This is
another setting in which the notion of defeasibility emerged.
Thus we have seen that there are three quite different settings in which the term
“defeasible” emerged.
The model proposed above of reasoning and argument, as a dialectical
process of the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments respectively (and we
Pollock writes: “Chisholm (1957) was the first epistemologist to use the term, taking it from Hart.
He was followed by Toulmin (1958), Chisholm (1966), Pollock (1967, 1970, 1971, 1974), Rescher
(1977), and then a number of authors.” (2008, p. 452)
2
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might add objections, criticisms, and rebuttals etc.), advocating and challenging the
claim of the initial argument, is in line with what many informal logicians and other
argumentation theorists have advocated. I believe that approach allows us to make
all the criticisms that need to be made, and is, in some ways, better than the
approach that Pollock adduces.
3. POLLOCK ON DEFEASIBILITY
There is little doubt that Pollock’s discussion of defeasibility and defeaters is part of
the reason for its popularity. In this section, I shall focus my discussion on the
accounts given by Pollock in Defeasible Reasoning (2008).3
Here is how he presents the idea in (2008):
In deductive reasoning, the reason schemes employed are deductive inference rules.
What distinguishes deductive reasoning from reasoning more generally is that the
reasoning is not defeasible. More precisely, given a deductive argument for a
conclusion, you cannot rationally deny the conclusion without denying one or more
of the premises. (p. 3)

Comment: Pollock’s account is off here. He means to refer to valid deductive
arguments, not deductive arguments as such. In a deductively valid argument, you
cannot rationally deny the conclusion without denying one or more of the premises.
Thus a deductively valid argument is not defeasible; a defeasible argument must be
one that is not deductively valid; Pollock does not spell that point out here but it is, I
believe, implicit in his treatment.
In contrast, consider an inductive argument. Suppose we observe a number of
swans and they are all white. This gives us a reason for thinking that all swans are
white. If we subsequently journey to Australia and observe a black swan, we must
retract that conclusion. But notice that this does not give us a reason for retracting
any of the premises. It is still reasonable to believe that each of the initially observed
swans is white. (p. 4)

Comment: Crucial to how Pollock presents defeasible reasoning is that new
information can force the retraction or revision of the conclusion. That is, someone
puts forth reasoning and then is confronted by information that forces a retraction
of the conclusion. So Pollock attributes the property of defeasibility to complex
rational objects—inferences and arguments, not to individual claims.
What distinguishes defeasible arguments from deductive arguments is that the
addition of information can mandate the retraction of the conclusion of a defeasible
argument without mandating the retraction of any of the earlier conclusions from
which the retracted conclusion was inferred. (p. 4)

The two expositions by Pollock that I am most familiar with, (1997) and (2008), are far from
identical. I find both puzzling, but the 2008 presentation seems clearer, which is why I have chosen it
over the account in Cognitive Carpentry (1997).
3
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Comment: It seems to me that being defeasible is a very different kind of property
than being deductive. “Deductive” refers to a structural property that inheres in the
argument; defeasibility is different kind of property; or, in the formal mode
“defeasibility” denotes a different type of property than does “deductive”. It is what I
have referred to as a dialectical property (2010); that is, it emerges in the way that
others respond to that argument.
Pollock treats the premises of arguments as information. This move shows
the influence of the AI/CS approach in its assumption that the premises of
arguments are, or consist of, information, a view that I will examine later. In other
traditions, premises are thought of as claims, assertions, propositions, beliefs; and
are often themselves controversial so that much of the subsequent discussion will
focus on the premises as to their truth (or warrantabilty or, plausibility -- the issue
of premise adequacy). I will be revisiting this point later.
By contrast, you cannot retract the conclusion of a deductive argument without also
retracting some of the premises from which it was inferred. (p. 4)

Comment: Again note that Pollock here means “deductively valid argument”.
Information that can mandate the retraction of the conclusion of a defeasible
argument constitutes a defeater for the argument. (p. 4)

Comment: In at least one important sense, information is, by definition, true (like
knowledge).4 But we also have the notion of “false information”. However, false
information cannot serve as the content of a defeater. So the concept of information
that Pollock uses needs further attention. In characterizing the content of the
defeater, Pollock also uses “new information” and “consideration.”
Summary: We can summarize Pollock’s (2008) position on defeasibility as
follows. Defeasibility is presented as a property of arguments.5 A defeasible
argument is one that is it is not deductively valid. This first condition leads to the
second condition: that information can mandate the retraction of the conclusion.
Each of these conditions, I will argue, is problematic. Pollock goes on now to discuss
two types of defeater: the rebutting defeater and the undercutting defeater. A
Dictionary.com defines “information” as “Knowledge communicated or received concerning a
particular fact, or circumstance; news.”
4

By extension, then, to reasoning and inference. This important point is not always underscored. I
quote here with permission an excerpt from a recent exchange between myself and Pinto:
Johnson: If I am reading Ch. 3 correctly, defeaters for an argument A are other arguments that either
undercut or rebut argument A.
Pinto: This, it seems to me, is a significant requirement that does not get picked up in subsequent
literature about Pollock. This requirement would significantly affect what is required for a defeater.
The one who wants to rebut or undercut has to mount an argument; not just make an assertion. It
seems to me that this view is (a) spot on; and (b) a much stronger position than that attributed to
Pollock and much stronger than that taken in standard expositions. But I could be wrong because I
am not that well grounded in that literature. [Used with permission.]
5
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rebutting defeater shows the conclusion of the argument to be false. An undercutting
defeater is one that attacks the inferential connection by showing that the premises
can be true and the conclusion false.
Pollock claims that “rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters are the
only kinds of defeaters necessary for describing the full logical complexity of
defeasible reasoning” (1995, p. 41). [Later in the book, Pollock seems to modify this
claim-- allowing for another kind of defeater (p. 105)6 and introducing the notion of
“a defeater of a defeater” (p. 110)].
The use of this framework helps clarify why Pollock does not include a type
of defeater for the premises of an argument, though attempting to defeat [or, I
would prefer to say, criticize] an argument by challenging one of its premises is
certainly one of the most common ways of attacking an argument. I return to this
matter later.
Pollock’s position is an extremely important one; it has been influential and
widely adopted. Pollock’s account focuses on defeasibility as it is applied to
arguments [reasoning]. There are two related conditions for an argument’s being
defeasible: the first is the condition of not-being-deductively valid. I call this the
“NDV” condition. This condition creates the possibility that the premises can be true
and the conclusion false. The second condition is the specification of a reason (in the
form of information) that is consistent with the premises but shows the conclusion
to be false; hence forces the retraction of the conclusion. The defeater actualizes the
possibility created by this condition. Implicit in this second condition is that the
articulation of the defeater takes the form of an argument.7
There are several problems with Pollock’s account.
First, there is the slight sloppiness in his presentation using “deductive” vs.
“deductively valid” but that is not a serious problem.
Second, there is some ambiguity in his specification of the defeasing material.
He typically refers to “information” but also to beliefs and justified beliefs. [In
(1995) he uses “new information” (p. 40) and “consideration” (p. 40).] What is clear
is that the defeater has propositional content (is true/false); moreover, because it
defeats a proposition, the proposition is true. I return to this matter later.
Third, the NDV condition creates a problem in the following way. To defeat
an argument
A <P1.P2.P3C>
one must produce not just an argument, but a good argument <B> that shows that
<A> is not a good argument. I think Pollock would agree with this, though neither
here, nor in the text of Cognitive Carpentry (1997) could I find this point made in just
those terms. But Pollock’s treatment of defeasibility, in effect, supplies us with a
template for specifying the defeater: i.e., constructing the counterargument. One
locates and cites a reason, R, that is compatible with the premises of A and which
6

But Pinto (2011, pp. 108-100) questions this claim.

This second condition gets associated in the literature with a wide variety of properties: the
conclusion of a defeasible argument has been said (not by Pollock but in the literature) to be
corrigible, falsifiable, revisable.
7
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shows that the conclusion of A is false. Hence whatever else we may say about the
premise of this defeater, it is put forward as true.
Now I think we should make explicit what I take to be implicit here: that R is
not just a reason, but a good reason. Pollock must be thinking that in order for the
critic to be justified in holding R to be true, the critic has to have good reasons for R:
D1, D2, etc. The complete counterargument (defeater) of A would look, then, like
this:
D1&D2 R;  –C.
Thus in Pollock’s approach, both the material defeased and the defeater are
arguments. I regard this as an important clarification of what has been implicit in
Pollock’s position.
To support my claim that the NDV clause creates a problem, let’s apply it to
the famous Tweety example.8 Someone, A, is supposed to have reasoned as follows:
<Tweety is a bird; birds fly; therefore Tweety flies>.
B responds with an undercutting defeater (which is in effect a counter-argument):
<Tweety is a penguin; penguins cannot fly [No penguin can fly]; therefore
‘Tweety flies’ is false>.
The new information contradicts the conclusion and forces the proponent to
withdraw it.
Does the defeater satisfy the NDV condition? Is it the case that the argument
is not deductively valid? It is not at all clear that it is. A’s reasoning, one might argue,
is ambiguous because of the second premise. It could be that A means “all birds fly,”
in which case the argument would be deductively valid; hence it would not be an
example of defeasible reasoning. Or, it could mean “most/some birds fly” in which
case it would be not-deductively-valid; hence defeasible. [See Pollock, p. 42].
Suppose A insisted that he meant the former. Then, as we saw, his argument
would be deductively valid; hence not defeasible. I now want to adopt the apparatus
of informal logic and say that that interpretation will make no difference to our final
evaluation, because we will now use exactly the same counterexample to make the
point that even though the argument is valid (hence not defeasible), it is still a bad
argument, because the second premise is false: “all birds fly” is false. We will argue
that penguins are birds and penguins don’t fly; therefore Tweety does not fly. In
other words, we can use the exact same reasoning here as we did in the prior
interpretation; the difference being that we need to have available the sort of
defeater that Pollock does not have: we allow for the argument to be rejected on the
ground that the premise is false, which we offered a reason for.

8

I have issues concerning the plausibility of this example but set them aside for now.
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It seems then to make no difference to the final judgement whether we
interpret the argument as a defeasible argument that is subject to a defeater, or, as a
bad argument because it has a false premise. In either case, the argument is to be
rejected and for the same reason (though framed in different terms).9
However, from my perspective as an informal logician, Pollock’s inventory of
defeaters has a glaring gap that has just become evident. There is a defeater for the
reason that falsifies the conclusion: a rebutting defeater; a defeater that falsifies the
inferential connection—an undercutting defeater; but no category for a defeater
that falsifies a premise! How to explain this gap that I call premise blindness? The
only answer I can think of is that traditionally those who taught formal deductive
logic used the soundness doctrine as their frame for evaluating and criticizing
arguments. There were two criteria: the premises must be true; the argument must
be deductively valid. The business of logic was the determination of deductive
validity. The issue of determining the truth of the premises was held to be a
substantive issue, extra-logical in character. I believe that premise blindness could
be an inheritance from the deductivist proclivities of formal logic.10
Here is where what I have referred to as the Informal Logic Initiative came
into play. It rejected the ideal of soundness, criticizing it on two fronts. First, it
rejected the deductivist view that validity was a necessary condition for a good
argument. The Informal Logic Initiative opposes deductivism.11 Second, the Informal
Logic Initiative raised the issue of premise adequacy: what are the proper
requirements for the premises of a good argument? Informal logicians have had an
ongoing debate about whether truth was an appropriate criterion to demand. Many
have argued for acceptability.12 But that matter is not at issue here. I am trying to
explain how Pollock could omit the challenges to the truth of the premises. One
answer I have suggested is that it is an inheritance of the tradition of logic
dominated by formal logicians and deductivism.
An approach to argument evaluation and criticism advocated by some
informal logicians understands arguments as having a more complex structure: as
having an illative core (in which the arguer gives the reasons that support the
conclusion) and a dialectical tier in which the arguer deals with objections, criticism,
and counterarguments. Criticism of the illative core takes place in terms of the
criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability.13 (I would add truth; see
Johnson, 2000, pp. 337-340 for my arguments). In the dialectical tier, the arguer has
to deal satisfactorily with counterarguments, objections and criticisms (Johnson,
2006).
William James is supposed to have said something like: “A difference that makes no difference is no
difference.”
9

If I am right, it illustrates the deep difficulty of parting company with deductivism. For a more
detailed treatment of this matter, see my (2010).
10

11

See my (2006).

Informal logicians, however, have made important inroads into what is called the issue of premiseadequacy: Hamblin (1970), Govier (1987, 1999), Freeman (2005), Johnson (2006), Blair (2012).
12

13

But see Blair (2012), for his second thoughts.
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The position I would want to develop (but can only indicate here) is that
because of the problems with the deployment of the defeasibility frame, those who
wish to study argument/argumentation will be better off to approach such matters
using the traditional conceptual apparatus of logical criticism [argument,
counterargument, criticism, objection, rebuttal] supplemented by developments
from Informal Logic and Argumentation Studies.
I have discussed the history of the idea and also important settings in which
it developed and found that there are issues surrounding these expositions of
“defeasibility” in respect of what it means and what it is applied to. (I have also
noted but not developed its relation to cognate notions like “prima facie” and
“presumptive.”)
The notion of defeasibility has come to designate a kind of looseness in
reasoning that stems from the inferential connection’s being not airtight
(deductively valid). The cash value seems to be that the reasoning in question can be
invalidated/undermined/annulled by new information (while leaving the original
premises intact.) It is this property of defeasibility that in the literature comes to be
associated with a wide variety of properties such as: annulled, cancelled, revisable,
corrigible, falsifiable, criticisable – a matter I take up below.
4. SOME ISSUES SURROUNDING THE NOTION OF DEFEASIBILITY
In this section I look at some issues regarding what I call the “defeasibility frame”
from the perspective of informal logic. Here I have focussed on Pollock but these
same issues will apply to many other treatments.
A: The notion of information may be more problematic than realized.
What is meant by information? The term is never really explained by Pollock
in (1997) or (2008). Consider this text:
Suppose Simon, whom I regard as very reliable, tells me, “Don’t believe Herbert. He
is incompetent.” That Herbert told me that not all swans are white gives me a reason
for believing that not all swans are white, but Simon’s remarks about Herbert give
me a reason for withdrawing my belief, and they do so without either (1) making me
doubt that Herbert said what I took him to say or (2) giving me a reason for thinking
it false that not all swans are white. Even if Herbert is incompetent, he might have
accidentally gotten it right that not all swans are white. Thus Simon’s remarks
constitute a defeater, but not a rebutting defeater. This is an example of an
undercutting defeater. (2008, p. 5)

It seems clear that by the nature of his account, “Herbert is incompetent” is treated
here as a defeater, a reason that undercuts the conclusion. It is a claim made by
Simon. It is put forward as true. But can it be categorized as “information”? It is
certainly a claim, likely one that Herbert (and others) would contest. And it is
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certainly a more robust concept of information than one would find in certain
quarters, e.g., in the mathematical theory of communication.14
In the Informal Logic Initiative, premises are thought of as claims, assertions,
proposition, beliefs. They are often themselves controversial, so that much
subsequent discussion will focus on the premises as to their truth, or warrantabilty
or, plausibility. This is the issue of premise-adequacy. What are the proper
requirements for the premises of a good argument? Informal logicians have had an
ongoing debate about whether truth was an appropriate criterion to demand. Many
have argued for acceptability.15 But that matter is not at issue here. I am trying to
explain how Pollock could omit the challenges to the truth of the premises. The
answer I have suggested is that it is an inheritance of the tradition of logic
dominated by formal logicians and deductivism. This is the more remarkable when
we recall Pollock’s explicit statement that it “is logically impossible to reason
successfully about the world using only deductive reasoning “(1995, p. 41). For an
explanation of how possible see my (2010).
B. The Defeasibility Frame has seen the development of a kind of looseness that
surrounds what I call the uptake category.
Pollock himself is clear and consistent on this point: the information requires that
the conclusion be retracted. However, in the literature that has developed around
the idea of defeasibility, a variety of terms have been used to refer to this property.
Here is the Wikipedia entry16:
Defeasible reasoning is a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning, where the
reasoning does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e.,
where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion are acknowledged. [Retrieved: 14
March, 2013]

Comment: First, this account implies that fallibility and corrigibility cannot occur in
deductive reasoning, which is false. In 1993 Andrew Wiles put forward what he (and
others) thought was a proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. Subsequent work by Katz
showed that the proof was flawed. Second, this account connects defeasibility with
the fallibility or corrigibility of the conclusion. This seems doubly wrong;
In an exchange I had with Steve Patterson, he wrote: “The question of what it means for premises
to be information is an interesting one. I would wager that Pollock… is almost certainly using a
conception of information that goes back at least to Claude Shannon's 1948 paper “A Mathematical
Theory of Communication”. …There is also a nice overview of Shannon's work at this page at NYU:
https://www.nyu.edu/pages/linguistics/courses/v610003/shan.html.
Their
summary:
On
Shannon's view, and the view of information theory more generally, information is the property a
communication (e.g. string of code, etc.) has when it decreases uncertainty (i.e. randomness or
noise).” [Used with permission.]
14

Informal logicians, however, have made important inroads into what is called the issue of premiseadequacy. Hamblin [1970], Govier 1987, 1999], Freeman [2005], Johnson [2006] Blair [2012].
15

I cite this entry from Wikipedia not because I regard it as reliable, far from it; but because it is a
ready to hand reference that some may get their notion of defeasibility from.
16
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defeasibility a la Pollock attaches to the argument or inference, not to components
(premises or conclusion); and the conclusion to be drawn from the countermanding
information is not that the conclusion is fallible, but that it is false.
Other accounts unpack “defeasibility” using other terms, such as “revisable”
and “criticisable.” These are not at all the same thing as the retracting of the
conclusion that is the earmark of defeasibility. Blair (2012) has recently made the
case that “revisability” is not the same as “defeasibility”:
Are “defeasible” and “revisable” synonyms in this context? Could we equally use
either term? No, for an argument that is defeasible might not be revisable. It might
be not only defeasible, but in fact defeated devastatingly, and as a result be
unsalvageable. So defeasibility does not imply revisability. And does an argument
need to be revised only if in its original form it has been defeated: does revisability
imply defeasibility? No again, for an argument can require and permit revision
because one of its premises has been shown to need repair and repair is possible,
but not because (or not only because) its conclusion has been upset. So revisability
does not imply defeasibility. The two concepts are independent.

Likewise I think it can be argued that “defeasible” is not synonymous with
“falsifiable.” The latter term has generally been associated with scientific theories, as
a property proposed originally by Popper to demarcate between genuine and bogus
scientific theory. But we do not generally think of arguments as being falsifiable.
If we are going to persist, we must keep the term “defeasibility” from being
used equivocally—in a sense not compatible with the meaning assigned to it by
Pollock.
C. The Defeasibility Frame as presented here invokes a victory-defeat model.
To develop this point, let me ask this question: What is gained by applying the
metaphor (framework) of defeat to argumentation? This language applies most
clearly to competitive settings where there is some mechanism or process for
determining who wins and who loses, victory and defeat. To cite a clear case; the
team that wins four games of the World Series in baseball is the winner. Thus, there
are no debates about who won the World Series in 2012 when San Francisco swept
the Detroit Tigers in four straight ( though there are lots of debates about who
should have won). Similarly, in chess, there is a clear-cut process for determining
who wins the game.
There are no comparable mechanisms in the realm of argumentation. A puts forth
an argument and B responds by lodging an objection which he claims is a defeater: does
B therefore win? Not unless A concedes.
It seems to me unfortunate to adopt a model that construes argumentation in terms
of victory and defeat. I would propose instead a co-operative model (such as was implicit
in my treatment of a theory of criticism in my 2000, pp. 217-248; see also Patterson,
2011). In this approach, the purpose of argumentation would be to arrive at the best
outcome; and we agree that the way to achieve this is through the giving and processing
and criticizing and evaluation of reasons. There is room for opposition here: for lodging
objections and criticisms; and for them to be responded to. The traditional conceptual
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apparatus of logic (objection and reply, rebuttal, counterargument, suitably developed)
can help us accomplish all that we want to accomplish when it comes to criticism of
argumentation.
5. CONCLUSION
I began my paper by looking at Pollock’s account and suggesting that there were
some loose ends that needed to be tightened and proposed amendments. I then
argued that there were problems with the “NDV” clause; and the second condition,
which originally was limited to the retraction of the conclusion. I then entered some
reservations about the approach to argument criticism via The Defeasibility Frame
arguing, first, that the notion of information needs to be clarified; second, that it had
witnessed an unhealthy broadening in the secondary literature to include such
notions as “revisability,” which, I argued, are different from the idea of defeasibility;
and, third, that The Defeasibility Frame promotes adversariality.
To conclude, I want to suggest that if one is concerned with the critical
evaluation of argument, one can get by without the idea of defeasibility.17 The
traditional language of argument criticism [objection, criticism, rebuttal, etc.], when
suitably developed and enhanced along the lines suggested by informal logic, can
meet our needs in terms of analyzing and evaluating everyday argumentation,
without the problems that, I have tried to point out in this paper, attend the concept
of defeasibility.
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